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Abstract 
In this paper we develop a probability of default (PD) model for mortgage loans, taking 
advantage of the Spanish Credit Register, a comprehensive database on loan characteristics 
and credit quality. From that model, we calculate different types of PDs: point in time, PIT, 
through the cycle, TTC, average across the cycle and acyclical. Then, we compare 
capital requirements coming from the different Basel II approaches. We show that minimum 
regulatory capital under Basel II can be very sensitive to the risk measurement methodology 
employed. Thus, the procyclicality of regulatory capital requirements under Basel II is an 
open question, depending on the way internal rating systems are implemented and 
their output is utilised. We focus on the mortgage portfolio since it is one of the most under 
researched areas regarding the impact of Basel II and because it is one of the most 
important banks’ portfolios. 
 
JEL: E32, G18, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
How will capital requirements evolve with Basel II? This is a key question to evaluate the real 
impact of the change in the capital requirements framework brought about by the release in 
June 2004 (updated June 2006) by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of 
its International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, the so-called 
Basel II framework. Bankers, regulators, and academics have tried to answer this question 
during the process of discussion of Basel II (beginning in 1999) with different aims. Bankers 
are concerned about the impact of Pillar 1 credit, market and operational risk requirements 
on the capital level of each bank as well as the additional impact that Pillar 2 could have on 
minimum requirements stemming from Pillar 1. Moreover, Pillar 3 transparency requirements 
regarding risk exposure have also been a concern for banks. Regulators have focused 
their interest on obtaining capital requirements proportional to risk in order to make sure that 
bank managers, and bank stakeholders have, in general, enough incentives to measure and 
manage risk properly. Academics and some central banks have shown concerns regarding 
the impact that Basel II might have on the aggregate behaviour of banks along the cycle, 
especially in financial stability terms. 
A more targeted question focuses on the procyclicality of Basel II. A series of 
questions arise from this. Are capital requirements under Basel II going to be excessively 
procyclical? How much will capital requirements vary from one period to the next? 
Will that put too much pressure on the soundness and stability of financial systems of 
different jurisdictions? Will capital requirements become binding during recessions? 
These questions have attracted much attention from bankers, regulators, central banks, 
and academics1. The evidence provided up to now has been, in general, supportive of 
procyclical concerns. However, Gordy and Howells (2006) challenge this view, arguing 
that collateral, maturity, bank behaviour and Pillar 2 and 3 may substantially temper Basel II 
procyclicality, and they conclude by proposing a specific solution to it. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a methodology for the analysis of 
capital requirements under Basel II that will allow us to focus on the procyclicality issue, 
and to assess with real data the impact of various ways to compute probabilities of 
default (e.g. point-in-time, through-the-cycle, averages along the cycle, corrected for the 
cycle, etc.). One of the most important conclusions that different supervisors and regulators 
have observed in analysing simulated Basel II capital requirements is that there is a wide 
dispersion among credit institutions that does not correspond with identifiable differences 
in risk. In fact, the various methods or even the different alternatives that banks use to 
estimate their key credit risk parameters (i.e. the probability of default), are to some extent 
responsible for the wide variability and uncertainty surrounding the internal ratings-based 
approach (IRB) proposed by the BCBS to calculate regulatory capital. 
Furthermore, considering that within the wide range of possibilities of calculation 
of PDs some are clearly influenced by the prevailing economic conditions, major fluctuations 
                                                                          
1. See, among others, Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001), Ervin and Wilde (2001), Allen and Saunders (2004), Amato and 
Furfine (2004), Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina (2004), Kashyap and Stein (2004), Taylor and Goodhart (2004), 
Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2005), Gordy and Howells (2006), Repullo and Suárez (2006) and 
White (2006). Separately, Pennacchi (2005) and Madan and Unal (2006) study the procyclicality but, in this case, with 
regard to deposit insurance. 
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and high variability among credit institutions' requirements may take place as a result of 
Basel II. Consequently, the aim of this paper is general and it may be used to assess 
corporate and retail portfolios. However, here we focus on one of the most under researched 
areas regarding Basel II, which is the potential procyclicality of mortgage portfolios. This lack 
of research may be a consequence of the lack of data even though mortgages are, for retail 
banks and many internationally active banks, one of their largest portfolios. Moreover, the 
cyclicality of the mortgage portfolio is also interesting because the largest contribution to 
the reduction in IRB minimum regulatory capital, according to the latest quantitative studies, 
comes from this specific portfolio [see BCBS (2006a)]. 
First, we develop a classification system which encompasses a model that 
estimates a probability of default for each obligor: that is, there is a model which assigns an 
individual PD for each particular borrower. Second, we evaluate different rating systems 
based on the way the PD is calculated: PD estimations can be used directly (i.e. point in time), 
averaged across the cycle using different criteria, or we can use the worst-case PDs 
(i.e. through the cycle)2. Finally, we compare capital requirements using different Basel II 
formulas and approaches (i.e. Standardized and IRB). The results provided in this paper show 
that capital requirements under Basel II may be very sensitive to the risk measurement 
methodology. Thus, the procyclicality of Basel II is an open question, depending on the way 
banks’ internal rating systems are implemented: specifically, on how the main inputs of the 
Basel II formulas, basically PDs, are calculated. 
We have information that covers a long period of time which allows us to evaluate 
the impact of Basel II capital requirements on mortgage portfolios along a full business 
cycle, including a collapse of house prices. The information comes from a single database: 
the Spanish Credit Register (CIR) run by Banco de España3. It includes information on 
almost the whole population of mortgages granted by all Spanish credit institutions. 
Therefore, we can perform a global analysis for the whole banking system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the 
procyclicality discussion under Basel II and the literature on mortgage capital regulation. 
Section 3 presents the PD estimation methodology employed in this paper and the database 
which supports it. Section 4 shows the results in terms of distributions of PDs along time. 
Section 5 focuses on capital requirements using as input to calculate them the PDs obtained 
in the previous section. Finally, Section 6 provides a conclusion. 
                                                                          
2. See Heitfield (2005) for a formal discussion of point-in-time and through-the-cycle rating systems. 
3. Jiménez and Saurina (2004), Trucharte (2004) and Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) contain a detailed description of 
the Spanish Credit Register. 
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2 Procyclicality and the mortgage market 
The impact of Basel I on lending policies and on economic activity has been subject to 
intense research. Empirical papers have found evidence of a credit crunch at the beginning 
of the nineties in the US. Some papers consider that lending contraction due to a capital 
crunch may be attributed to Basel I capital requirements4. During the discussion of Basel II 
proposals, some analysts have stated concerns regarding various issues, procyclicality was 
among the most controversial ones. The underlying argument goes as follows: procyclicality 
would basically translate into lower capital requirements when favourable economic 
conditions prevail, and into higher requirements under unfavourable conditions. This could 
have an undesirable effect on the overall economy if banks, according to a more risk-sensitive 
regulatory capital system, are obliged to significantly alter their lending behaviour. 
To take an example, if credit models overstate default risk during recessions, capital 
requirements will increase in consequence. As a result, banks will respond by tightening 
their credit standards and, in the last instance, by reducing their volume of lending to comply 
with the higher ratios of the new capital regime. Economic agents (basically households 
and firms) will experience serious difficulty to recover under these adverse economic 
conditions. This means that the most unfavourable part of the business cycle may become 
more accentuated if banks cut down on credit, aggravating the general economic situation 
and magnifying the economic downturn. The opposite will occur in the benign part of the 
business cycle. A good summary of arguments supporting this view, focusing on the content 
of Basel II, can be found in Taylor and Goodhart (2004). Alternative arguments, again focusing 
on the Basel II proposal, appear in Gordy and Howells (2006). 
In order to address procyclicality, Gordy and Howells (2006) argue that the best 
option for supervisors is to smooth the output (i.e. smooth the final capital requirements 
derived from the Basel II proposal) instead of the inputs (i.e. the PDs that enter IRB formulas) 
or the formulas in themselves (flattening of the curves). They propose an autoregressive 
capital requirement formula or another directly tied to the position of the economic cycle. 
Goodhart (2005) claims that a second instrument is needed to maintain financial stability, 
since interest rates (the first instrument) are devoted to control the inflation. He underlines 
that such an additional instrument should have countercyclical characteristics. Jiménez and 
Saurina (2006) argue for a countercyclical loan loss provision that, in fact, could also work as 
a capital requirement throughout Pillar 2. 
Note that, even if the new capital requirements were procyclical as described above, 
it is necessary that particular conditions hold for there to be ill effects. First, bank managers 
should not react to the cyclical profile of their capital buffer. Second, it should not be 
excessively costly for banks to raise preference shares or subordinated debt during 
downturns. Furthermore, the cyclical effect must be significant5 and the capital buffer decline 
must have a significant impact on lending policies6. Finally, the reduction in lending should 
                                                                          
4. See, among others, Bernanke and Lown (1991), Berger and Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995). 
5. Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina (2004) find a significant but small cyclical impact of GDP on the capital buffer hold by 
Spanish banks. 
6. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) find evidence of the impact of capital on lending policies in a sample of Italian banks 
while Altumbas, Fazylow y Molineux (2002) and Ehrmann et al. (2003) do not find support for the hypothesis that poorer 
capitalized banks suffer more under tight monetary conditions. 
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only be a supply side factor (i.e. not induced by a weak demand for loans) and that 
non-financial firms should not be able to substitute bank funding by trade credit and/or resort 
to short or long term markets (e.g. commercial paper, bonds, asset backed securities, etc.)7. 
Before getting real data based on Basel II requirements, which will happen at the 
earliest in the European Union in 2007 for the more basic approaches and in 2008 for 
the more advanced ones8, most effort has been concentrated on trying to anticipate the 
future behaviour of banks using past portfolio information. These attempts have focused, 
overwhelmingly, on the corporate (and sovereign) portfolios, those for which there is more 
publicly available information on credit quality [among others: Segoviano and Lowe (2002), 
Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004), Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Goodhart (2005)]. 
Some work has been done on the retail SME portfolio [e.g. Dietsch and Petey (2002), Saurina 
and Trucharte (2004) and Jacobson, Jesper and Roszbach (2006)] and credit cards 
[Lang, Mester and Vermilyea (2006)], while mortgages are very little explored. 
Empirical work on Basel II procyclicality has usually been based on corporate 
portfolios and, normally, on Moodys-KMV ratings. Here, for the first time in the literature, 
we evaluate the potential cyclical behaviour of Basel II capital requirements in mortgage 
portfolios, using a prototype of rating system in the same vein as those that banks employ to 
classify their mortgage obligors when granting a loan. These, in the future, will be the ones 
utilised for qualification for the more advanced Basel II approaches. 
Mortgage markets have been widely studied. Allen (2004) surveys this literature as 
well as more general Basel II issues (i.e. procyclicality, incentives, securitization, and capital 
arbitrage). It also focuses on Basel impact on mortgage markets, although the papers 
she cites (where emphasis is devoted to the German market) are quite different from our 
paper, since none of them develops a classification system in order to determine capital 
requirements for mortgage portfolios under Basel II premises. Similarly, our paper departs 
from Calem and LaCour-Little (2004) who simulate economic capital for mortgage portfolio 
and conclude that Basel I or Basel II standardized approach, which offer little risk 
differentiation, result in significant divergence between economic and regulatory capital. 
                                                                          
7. A summary of these arguments is in Viñals (2006). 
8. The Basel II schedule is even more delayed for certain jurisdictions, e.g, the US. 
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3 Estimation methodology and database 
3.1 PD equation for borrowers 
The first step consists of the developing of a PD model for mortgage borrowers. We do 
not have detailed information on borrowers' social and financial characteristics (marital 
status, type of employer, income, wealth, etc.). However, we do have information in the 
Credit Register that may be used to characterize the risk profile of borrowers. To account 
for the business cycle, we use contemporaneous real GDP growth rates. The PD equation 
we estimate is the following: 
 
ittititit CONTROLGDPGLIQBORRRISKBORRPD ηββββ ++++= 4321  (1) 
The endogenous variable is a dichotomous (zero-one) variable which takes value 1 if 
a borrower defaults in year t, 0 otherwise. It has to be clearly stated that the estimated PDs 
are a measure of the likelihood that an obligor will default within a certain assessment horizon. 
This horizon is fixed at a one-year period. Under this premise, the endogenous variable is 
constructed, also assuming that a defaulted obligor is defined in a similar way as in Basel II9: 
at least 90 days overdue, failing to meet financial obligations on a certain loan. If a borrower 
has several mortgages, failure to meet payments on any of them means that this borrower is 
in default. Based on that, we estimate a logistic transformation of equation (1) by the standard 
maximum likelihood maximization process. 
Among the explanatory variables, RISKBORRit is a vector of risk profile 
characteristics of each borrower evaluated at time t. In particular, we use DEFHISTit as a 
variable which informs whether a certain borrower has defaulted in any period previous to 
the one used to fix the one-year assessment period for which the PD is calculated 
(i.e. possible failure in t-2, t-3...). Additionally, this variable is weighted by the distance in time 
since the default of that obligor took place. Thus, the more distant in time the default took 
place, the less it counts, which seems in line with banks’ credit policy practices in general. 
OVERHISTit is another risk profile variable which accounts for the possibility 
that a borrower has been delinquent in previous periods (t-1, t-2...). That is, OVERHISTit 
represents borrowers overdue on their loans who finally meet their financial obligations 
before the 90-day threshold, that is, before becoming officially defaulted. As for the previous 
variable, this one is also weighted by the distance in time a borrower committed delinquency 
on his loan. It has to be noted that many of the problems that are behind an overdue loan are 
“technical” ones, spanning only a few days as a result of mistakes or lack of monitoring of 
balances, accidental cash shortage, holidays, etc. Nevertheless, we include this risk profile 
variable since a risk averse borrower will always hold a minimum buffer for unexpected events 
to avoid, precisely, becoming overdue. 
We also include as an explanatory variable the rate of change in the latter variable 
(CHANOVERHISTit). Its inclusion intends to anticipate future declines in borrowers’ ability 
to repay their mortgages. Finally, the variable AGEit measures the age of each loan which 
usually coincides with the number of years each borrower has been in the Credit Register, 
                                                                          
9. See BCBS (2006 b), paragraph 452. 
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that is, it represents his age as a borrower. As will be shown later, there is a particular 
relationship between the age of a loan and its probability of default, showing that, in general, 
higher rates of default take place during the first years of a mortgage. After that period of time 
(three to four years), the rate of default decreases progressively with the age of the loan10. 
We also include in equation (1) a vector of variables that proxy for the liquidity 
constraints that a borrower may face (LIQBORRit). Variable UTILit is the quotient between 
the amount of credit drawn by a borrower and the total available amount (credit line). 
Some mortgages are sold as a credit line facility where the borrower can withdraw money at 
any time against the amount already repaid. The collateral (i.e. the house that constitutes the 
object of the mortgage) remains pledged to the credit line. The more a borrower withdraws, 
the more liquidity constrained he may be. The second liquidity variable is NUMBANKSit, the 
number of banks with which the borrower has lending relationships. Note that we focus on 
individual borrowers, not banks. As a result, we hypothesize that the higher the number of 
banks a borrower is related to, the more constrained he is in terms of liquidity. 
The above-mentioned risk profile and liquidity variables are only a subset of those 
we have used. Apart from levels or first differences, we have tried continuous and discrete 
specifications. Given that many of these variables are highly correlated, we previously ran 
univariate regressions (borrower mortgage default as a function of a variable at a time). From 
those regressions we took the variables with the highest explanatory power. Later on, we ran 
equation (1) using combinations of the selected variables. Based on forecasting capacity11, 
the main guide for banks when they develop their scoring/rating systems, we finally 
determined the set of variables included in the final multivariate regression. 
Note that banks, in developing their internal models for mortgage defaults, have 
much more detailed information on each borrower (basically, income and social information). 
We are hypothesizing here that the past experience of a borrower, both in terms of overdue 
and defaulted loans, as well as the age in the Credit Register, are a sufficient statistic for that 
information. Thus, the main difference between our benchmark model and those of banks 
lies in the accuracy of default forecasts (i.e. the percentage of defaulted and non-defaulted 
borrowers properly classified as such). Note that this is less relevant in our paper since 
we focus on the behaviour of PDs along the cycle and the different ways they are calculated, 
as well as the dispersion they may create in determining regulatory capital. There is no reason 
to think that our sufficient statistic performs differently in upturns and downturns. 
Our cyclical variable in model (1) is the real GDP growth rate (GDPGt). Among 
the CONTROL variables, we have included a dummy that accounts for the region of the 
borrower. We also control for the type of mortgage lender: commercial bank, savings bank, 
credit cooperative or credit finance establishments. Savings banks (not-for-profit banks) hold 
half of the market share in mortgages. Moreover, the risk profile may change according to 
the ownership structure of the bank [Delgado, Salas and Saurina (2006)]. We also include a 
dummy variable (REG99) that takes the value of 1 from 1999 onwards and 0 otherwise, in 
order to reflect the change in the report of defaulted loans in the database. After 1999, any 
defaulted amount is reported while before that year only defaults above 6,000 euros were 
reported. The expected sign of the dummy variable is positive. 
                                                                          
10. A similar behaviour, an inverted U-shaped curve between the age of a loan and its probability of default, is found on 
credit card delinquencies by Gross and Souleles (2002). 
11. This predicting capacity has to be understood in terms of accurate classification of defaulted and non-defaulted 
borrowers. 
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3.2 Database 
The database used for this study is the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain (CIR). The CIR 
records monthly information on all credit operations granted by credit institutions (commercial 
banks, savings banks, credit cooperatives and specialised credit institutions) in Spain for 
a value of over €6,000. The CIR’s data structure distinguishes between credits given to 
firms and those to individuals12. The CIR includes information on the characteristics of each 
loan, including the following: instrument (trade credit, financial credit, leasing, etc.), currency 
denomination, maturity, existence or not of guarantees or collateral, type of guarantor 
(government or credit institution), the coverage of the guarantee, the amount drawn and 
undrawn of a credit commitment and, finally, but very importantly, whether the loan is 
current in payment or past due (distinguishing between delinquency and default status). 
The CIR also includes information relating to the characteristics of borrowers: province of 
residence and, for firms, the industry in which they operate. There is no information regarding 
the interest rate of the loan. 
Here, we focus on mortgages to individuals. These are collateralized loans 
with maturity over five years. The time period covered goes from 1990 to 2004, which covers 
a whole business cycle in Spain, with a deep recession around 1993 and the corresponding 
upturn, even boom, during the nineties and the first years of the current decade. Given the 
very low threshold for a loan to be included within the CIR, we can be confident of having 
information about the entire population of mortgages in Spain. That means dealing with 
a vast amount of information (over 30 million loans) which makes it almost impossible to 
run any regression. Accordingly, we have cut down the population into another tractable 
one by choosing only a certain number of borrowers. A sampling procedure was carried out 
based on a very simple rule that produced a stratified sample that perfectly matches with 
the main characteristics of the entire population. After sampling the population of loans 
we are still left with almost 3 million mortgages. To the best of our knowledge, we are not 
aware of any paper that uses such an amount of information for modelling default probabilities 
of mortgages. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the whole population of mortgages 
as well as those of the sample chosen. Note that even though the default ratios (proportion 
of defaulted borrowers) may sometimes be quite low (below 1%), given the amount of 
observations we have, this is not a problem for the estimation of model (1). 
It can also be seen that the number of borrowers as well as the amount lent 
increases significantly along time, while the increase in the average size of the loan less 
than doubles. The problem loan ratio as well as the proportion of defaults (i.e. rough PD 
calculations from the population and the sample) follows a cyclical pattern reaching a 
maximum around 1993 (the recession year). The extremely low current levels show 
the strength of the business cycle in Spain and/or the change in banks´ credit risk policies. 
From Table 1 we can conclude that there is an almost perfect matching between the main 
characteristics of the whole population and the sample we have taken from it. 
3.3 Results 
Table 2a, column 1, shows the results of the estimation of model (1). All the variables have the 
expected signs and are significant at the 99% level. The higher the risk profile of a borrower 
                                                                          
12. There is a clear separation between the characteristics of loans to companies (mainly in terms of the size of the loan, 
maturity, collateral and default rates) and those loans granted to individuals, making it appropriate to treat each of the 
two groups separately. 
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the higher the probability of default. Consequently, overdue loans (OVERHISTit and 
CHANOVERHISTit) can be considered as a signal of future default (both in levels and rates of 
growth). Regarding other variables, the older a loan, the lower its probability of default13 
(negative sign of the age variable). Taking into account liquidity issues, the higher the use of 
bank funds and the more lenders an individual resorts to, the higher the probability of default 
(positive sign for UTILit and NUMBANKSit). Thus, liquidity constraints also seem to play a role 
in mortgage defaults. 
Commercial banks (omitted dummy variable of ownership type) are the least risky 
regarding mortgages, whereas credit finance establishments show the highest PD (not shown 
in the Table). The latter credit institutions hold a small market share (around 1%) but they 
concentrate on riskier borrowers, maybe those who cannot obtain a mortgage from deposit 
institutions. 
The sign of the cyclical variable included in the regression, GDP growth rate, is 
negative and significant, as expected. During downturns and recessions, mortgage defaults 
increase, declining in upturns. Therefore, PDs fluctuate along the cycle. In the next section we 
analyse how much they may vary depending on the way they are calculated. The borrowers’ 
classification system is used as the basis for obtaining the different estimates of the PDs. 
The second through fourth columns of Table 2a show that the former results are 
robust, both in terms of sign and significance, to changes in control variables. Column 2 
shows the results of the regression when the type-of-lender dummies have been taken out. 
Column 3 excludes regional dummies and, finally, column 4 excludes both sets of dummies. 
In addition, we have performed several robustness analyses on the results 
presented in Table 2a (not shown to save space). We also included an interest rate 
variable (both nominal and real). It is positive and significant in both cases but the accuracy 
of the model does not improve significantly. We have also excluded GDPG and included 
the interest rate with very similar quantitative results. We could probably have included other 
business cycle variables but, we might have lost clarity in modelling changes that take into 
account cyclical variables. This is why we stick only to the GDPG for the measurement of 
cyclical effects. More importantly, both the average level of PDs and their shape along time 
according to different rating methodologies do not change much irrespective of the macro 
variables that may be used. 
Once the variables that determine an individual's possibility of defaulting have been 
established and their coefficients and signs within the multivariate model are known, it is 
desirable to establish certain performing measures for the estimated regression model in 
order to evaluate its classification power. Table 2b shows the classification table of the final 
model. It can be observed along the main diagonal that the model correctly classifies 
approximately 77% of the borrowers included in the sample. In terms of alternative performing 
measures, the area under the ROC curve roughly reaches 78% which results in an Accuracy 
Ratio (AR) near to 57%14. 
The previous classification power is obtained for the training sample. In order to test 
the consistency of the model a validation sample should be constructed using external 
                                                                          
13. This is in line with firm defaults, where young firms have a higher mortality. 
14. The AR measure determines the performance enhancement over the random model of the model under evaluation 
[model (1)] with respect to the ideal model.  
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data (2005 data). The validation process simply consists of calculating the score of every 
borrower and comparing it with its observed default status. The results are reasonably close 
to those of the training sample (almost 77% of individuals were correctly classified) indicating 
a satisfactory classification capability of the estimated model. 
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4 Probabilities of default along the cycle and rating methodologies 
Once model (1) has been estimated, each borrower in the sample is assigned an 
individual PD based on the characteristics of the borrower (idiosyncratic factors) and 
on a macro variable (common cyclical factor). This allows us to rank each borrower according 
to his PD as well as to calculate alternative values for average PDs for the entire sample in 
order to evaluate their main properties and, finally, their procyclical implications. 
The first PD obtained is the easiest to calculate (the point-in-time, PIT, PD). We can 
use the actual PD (that is, the ratio between the number of mortgage borrowers that default 
in year t, not having defaulted in the previous period, over the total number of borrowers with 
a mortgage) or the estimated (fitted) one using the regression model and the predictions 
extracted from it. Given the two available options, we choose the first one in order to use the 
most accurate possible information. In any case, the sample average PDs in both approaches 
are, as expected, very similar (1.1% real and 1.2% fitted) as well as their shape along time. 
Table 3, column 1 shows the PIT PD values. It can be seen that there is substantial 
variation in the recorded level of that PD along time. Around the recession, Spanish banks 
experienced relatively high default rates. On the other hand, by the end of the last decade and 
at the beginning of the current one, when a protracted period of economic growth combines 
with a significant increase in the number of mortgages granted by banks, the observed PDs 
are quite low. It should be noted that the Spanish economy experienced during the period 
analysed a structural change which led to entry into the European Monetary Union in 1999. 
The second type of PD derived from the estimated classification system is 
the through-the-cycle one (TTC). According to Heitfield (2005), that PD is the one that 
would occur at the trough of the business cycle. This means that we have to use the value 
that the GDP growth rate took in year 1993, the most negative year in the sample, to 
calculate it. In fact, that year represents the worst recession that the Spanish economy has 
experienced in the last 40 years. Thus, to compute the PD we keep constant the GDPGt 
variable at the 1993 level while allowing for changes in the other significant variables 
included in model (1)15. Consequently, we obtain different individual TTC PDs as well as the 
overall one for each year. Table 3, second column, shows, as expected, that the average 
PD TTC is almost 80% higher than the PIT PD. However, taking into account how both PDs 
have been calculated, the profile along time of the TTC PD is much smoother than that of 
the PIT one. 
The third column in Table 3 contains another smoothing type of PD (a long-run 
average PD). This is a cumulative average, where the PD attributed to each year is the 
simple average of the yearly averages of the fitted PDs up to that year. As can be observed, 
the sample average is not too far away from the sample average of the TTC PD. This result is 
mainly obtained by construction since we start with high levels of PDs that remain along the 
cycle, thus influencing the long-run average. A partial answer to this problem is to use a rolling 
(moving) average, with the drawback of not including in the average the first years of 
the sample that, in our case, constitute those of the recession. It should be noted that for the 
                                                                          
15. The fitted PD is obtained by substituting in model (1) the value that each explanatory variable takes, keeping the 
value of GDPG fixed at the 1993 level. 
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rolling average PD volatility declines relative to PIT estimates the longer is the lag length 
applied. 
The last two columns in Table 3 show different variations of how a rating system 
may be used to calculate PDs. These represent different cyclical corrections in the values of 
the fitted PDs. Particularly, the fourth column of Table 3 presents PD estimates determined 
when the value of the GDP growth rate variable in model (1) is substituted by its average 
during the entire sample period (cyclically corrected PD)16. Volatility, measured by the 
standard deviation, declines dramatically in comparison with PIT or even TTC estimates. 
However, the sample average PD across the period is very close to that of the PIT PD. 
The coefficient of variation, that is, the dispersion measure that controls for the level of the 
mean, shows roughly similar dispersion for the TTC PDs and the cyclically corrected ones, 
while the levels are much higher for the former than for the latter. 
The last column of Table 3 shows what we could call an acyclical PD. This is 
calculated using a rating based on the prediction model (1) but excluding the cycle 
variable (GDPGt). That is, we reestimate model (1) without the cyclical variable and, 
subsequently, predict individual PDs in the absence of the common factor17. The results 
are almost identical if we exclude regional dummies (not shown). The sample average 
acyclical PD is very similar to the PIT one since we have smoothed away the large PDs 
during the recession. Nevertheless, the variability across PDs is higher for the PIT as a result 
of the relatively high values recorded in the early nineties. Accordingly, the volatility of the 
acyclical PDs is very low compared to that of the PIT one and, to some extent when 
compared to the volatility of the TTC PD. 
Figure 1 shows the outcome of the five different ways of calculating PD from the 
estimated rating system. There are significant differences across the various approaches 
that produce significantly distinct Basel II capital requirements for mortgages. In the next 
section we analyse these requirements. 
                                                                          
16. The cyclically corrected PD is obtained by substituting in model (1) the value that each explanatory variable takes in 
each year, keeping the value of GDPG fixed at its sample average value. 
17. It should be noted that not all the cyclical component can be taken out of the rating system since a high number 
of the idiosyncratic variables are influenced by it. A pure acyclical rating system (and the PDs from it) would need all 
remaining variables to be free of the cycle, which for some cases would suppose the estimation of a complete different 
model. 
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5 Capital requirements and procyclicality 
5.1 Basel II risk parameters (PDs) 
In order to measure capital requirements under the IRB approach for mortgages it is 
necessary to make a hypothesis regarding the loss given default, LGD. Given the 
supervisory experience acquired from the various Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) carried 
out by the BCBS in recent years, an LGD fixed at 15% seems to be a reasonable figure. 
In any case, as this parameter enters lineally in the Basel II capital requirement formulas, 
whenever it is set to a certain value its impact will only be a matter of level. Its shape will 
change over time only if LGDs are also dependent on the business cycle18 and are calculated 
using a cycle-sensitive approach. This would provide different LGD values for different periods 
of time (e.g. downturn LGD estimates). 
Table 4, first column, shows the capital requirements associated with a PIT PD. 
The fluctuation in capital figures is quite evident showing a substantial decline along the 
cycle. Compared with the new Standardized Approach regulatory requirements (2.8% capital 
figure for mortgages), IRB capital requirements are slightly higher for recession years 
whereas for upturns they can be very considerably lower. It is important to bear in mind 
that the Spanish credit market has changed significantly during the last decade and that 
banks have significantly improved their risk management procedures. Nevertheless, even 
acknowledging the structural shift in the Spanish economy and the improvement in credit risk 
management, PIT capital requirements are bound to change significantly along the cycle. 
As argued by the extant literature and by most regulators across the world, capital calculated 
using a PD totally dependent on the prevailing economic conditions will provoke a high 
volatility in banks’ solvency with the undesirable consequences that this effect implies. 
It is important to note that if the capital figure for 2004 (1.04%) is compared to 
the current regime figure for mortgage loans (around 4%), one may get a rough idea of 
where the important reductions in capital requirements, anticipated by exercises such as 
the Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) carried out by the BCBS, can be found. Average 
requirements along the cycle (1.56%, calculated using the PIT sample average), are much 
lower than the capital figure that the Standardized Approach of Basel II (SA) demands and 
very far indeed from the current one. The main conclusion from the use of such PDs is that 
supervisors via Pillar 2 would have to perform or articulate some measure to try to reduce 
the dispersion shown and to maintain an acceptable level of one of the most important 
elements that determines the soundness and stability of banks’ financial condition. 
TTC PDs have several important properties, as can be seen in Table 4, second 
column. In the first place, much of the dispersion that PIT PDs incorporate disappears. 
This is the result of how TTC PDs are calculated. The inclusion of the worst record of the 
business cycle in the PD equation assures that at the trough of the business cycle the amount 
of capital will totally cover the losses that the Basel II formulas stipulate at the 99.9% 
percentile (i.e. the excess over the expected losses which, in principle, are covered 
by provisions). 
                                                                          
18. Altman et al. (2005) study the relationship between PDs and LGDs for corporate bonds. 
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On the other hand, as the cycle moves towards its most benign part, the most 
adverse GDP growth rate figure in the PD equation partly compensates for the improvement 
experienced by the rest of the explanatory variables. This partial balance provokes a lower 
reduction in capital required and results in a lower associated volatility. Similarly, if the 
cycle moves into a new recession, the progressive deterioration of the rest of the variables 
will gradually increase the capital required as prevailing conditions deteriorate with no 
major variations from one period to the next. It can also be seen that the current capital 
requirements for the more advanced approaches of Basel II are one percentage point 
under those arising from the Standardized Approach (1.84% versus 2.8%), and are even less 
than half of those coming from the current capital regime (4%). 
In a similar vein, a PD based on a long-run average (in principle, that proposed 
by the BCBS to be used as the input for the credit capital requirement formulas) would 
normally produce similar results to the TTC PD described above. However this measure 
will never exactly reproduce the requirements needed to cover the unexpected losses at 
the 99.9% percentile at the trough of the business cycle, simply because of the way it is 
calculated. On the other hand, the requirements for boom periods will be lower than 
those obtained from a TTC PD, since the further the distance from the trough the more 
similar the long-run estimates are to those coming from a PIT PD. This fact translates into 
a higher variation of capital over the business cycle. The current IRB capital figure that would 
derive from this method of calculation would be, to some extent, lower than the figure coming 
from the Standardized Approach (40% lower) and almost 60% less than the current capital 
regime figure. 
Finally, the PDs corrected for the cycle (column 4 in Table 4) or those defined as 
acyclical (column 5 in Table 4) produce fairly similar results. It seems that when the variable 
representing the business cycle is set to its average value over the sample period, the effect 
on the estimated PDs is similar to the one that would take place when the cycle is obviated. 
The variability observed for these approaches is much lower than that in any other possibilities 
in which PDs can be calculated. However, at the trough of the business cycle these methods 
are those which seem to be least from adequate to cover the part of the unexpected 
losses associated with the 99.9% percentile. On the other hand, for the most favourable part 
of the cycle, the estimated PDs are much more similar to the real ones (PIT ones). As just 
said, the dispersion of this approach is the lowest. However, the omission of the cycle 
prevents from covering an important part of the losses that could take place and that 
could provoke solvency problems in case of severe adverse events. 
All the capital figures presented so far have been calculated considering PD 
averages. However, banks will not use this type of estimates to determine their regulatory 
capital requirements. Instead, for IRB purposes, banks will be required to employ their 
own rating systems. These are risk classification devices which discriminate borrowers 
according to their creditworthiness and, accordingly, assign them into different risk buckets. 
Each bucket represents an homogenous credit risk group and is characterized by an 
associated probability of default which depends crucially on both the nature of the rating 
system (PIT, TTC, average rating....) and how it is used to calculate the corresponding PD 
estimate (as described above in terms of average PDs, e.g. PIT, TTC, long-run, corrected 
for the cycle, ...). 
Notwithstanding that, the developing of a meaningful and consistent rating system, 
including the choice of the optimal number of risk buckets, is beyond the objectives of this 
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paper since that increases complexity significantly without achieving results much different 
from those commented so far using average PDs regarding the discussion on the issue of 
procyclicaltiy related to Basel II. 
Nevertheless, we tested the robustness of Table 4 results by developing, on the one 
hand, a tentative PIT rating system19, and on the other hand, an extreme case example which 
considers capital requirements directly calculated from individual obligors’ PD estimates. 
In this latter case, we calculate the capital figure for the whole mortgage portfolio by adding 
each borrower’s capital requirements weighted by her/his exposure with regard to the 
total exposure of the entire portfolio. Alternatively, capital requirements from the rating system 
are calculated by applying the average PD of each risk bucket to the exposure of all obligors 
that fall in each risk class proportionally to the total exposure of the whole portfolio. 
The results obtained show that the capital figure derived from the rating system 
is similar, although somehow lower, to that obtained by using an average PD, while 
that calculated for the extreme case of individual PD estimates is much lower20 (a maximum 
capital figure of 1.5% in bad times and a minimum of 0.7% in good times). Despite the 
relatively lower levels of capital requirements for these two cases, recorded variability along 
the sample period (business cycle), is, as for the above mentioned case regarding sample 
average PDs, very high. 
Since the purpose of this paper is to address and analyse variability and dispersion 
of capital figures along time depending on the method PDs are computed, the utilisation of 
sample average PDs to obtain capital requirements, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 2, 
although simple, seems a reasonable approximation (sufficiently informative) to discuss the 
procyclicality issue of regulatory capital regarding Basel II. 
5.2 Discussion on procyclicality 
The foregoing sections have shown that capital requirements under Basel II for mortgages 
significantly change depending on the method used by banks for calculating their credit risk 
parameters, namely, their PDs. The first lesson to be learned is that variability may be an 
important caveat as observed in the mortgage portfolio for the entire system and that the 
reduction in capital figures, considering possible estimates of measures of risk, could rise up 
to 75% with respect to the current capital regime. The use of PIT PDs is the extreme case, 
with significant variations across the business cycle. 
The second important idea that can be obtained from these results is the wide 
dispersion that can exist among banks when producing regulatory capital measures regarding 
Basel II and that may not correspond to real differences in borrowers’ risk profiles. 
Supervisors must be sure of the accuracy, reliability and application of the inputs that 
banks may use to determine IRB capital requirements. The previous section contained a very 
clear illustration of this situation: if capital is calculated using a PIT PD the resulting figure 
is 45% lower than that obtained if a TTC PD was used (a similar reduction is observed if a 
long-run average was used instead). This enormous variation in different ways of calculating 
measures of risk (all of them related, in one way or another, to the prevailing conditions of 
                                                                          
19. Such a rating system is based on nine buckets, the last one for defaulted loans, showing an exponentially 
growing PD while exposures across buckets follows a normal distribution, which are the two basic hypotheses 
underlying any rating system. 
20. The reason for this reduction in capital lies in the concavity of the IRB capital functions.  
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the economic cycle) must pose the question of which of them, if any, should be the most 
appropriate to determine capital figures. 
PIT PDs have important properties and are basically those that banks work with 
when applying their scoring/rating systems either for pricing or making the decision whether 
or not to grant a loan to a possible customer. Additionally, they allow for cross comparison 
among banks of their credit risk profiles and, as a result, produce accurate and homogenous 
assessments of the risk incurred by each bank. However, it seems highly unlikely that 
supervisors will be prepared to accept such a measure for computing capital, because of the 
high variability that it contains which is reflected in capital requirements under the Basel II 
formulas. 
Several options are open to try to work out this caveat: for example, those 
pointed out in Gordy and Howells (2006) by means of smoothing the final output through a 
countercyclical capital requirement formula in Pillar 2. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) argue for 
a countercyclical loan loss provision. However, the same mechanism or a similar one 
could be used for capital requirements in Pillar 2. That countercyclical mechanism would 
be transparent and, thus, not hamper Pillar 3 market discipline, which seems to be one of the 
main worries in Gordy and Howells (2006) who postulate the smoothing of the output but not 
of the inputs. 
TTC PDs may not be the answer to the previous question either, since the level of 
requirements is quite above any other measure, especially for the benign part of the business 
cycle. Banks could be asked for a high level of capital when clearly it is not required given 
the level of actual risk. However, this measure assures that at the trough of the business 
cycle, losses will be covered (under the Basel II framework) with a 99.9% probability. 
A trade-off comes up in this situation: enjoying a high probability of covering losses when 
most needed, as against requiring banks to maintain a buffer of excess of capital over their 
real needs. 
Although counterintuitive, this type of risk measure also discriminates between the 
degree of risk each bank incurs. PIT PDs reflect both current economic and obligor-specific 
conditions whereas TTC ones only reflect the latter as all banks share in the PD equation the 
same value for the cycle variable (the most adverse one in the sample period). Nevertheless, 
in terms of creditworthiness, both measures incorporate valid information to classify obligors 
with respect to the inherent risk that their profile presupposes. 
Finally, it is also important to take into account the asymmetry in requirements that 
this measure produces. As said before, by using a TTC PD, supervisors can be sure that for a 
recession period, capital required will be in line with the real needs that the economic situation 
implies. On the other hand, the misallocation of capital only comes during upturns. This could 
be considered as a price for a lower level of volatility in capital figures anticipating possible 
future bad times, when raising capital could be much harder to obtain (and in any case, far 
more expensive) than maintaining a higher amount in good times. 
Long-run averages share most of the properties of TTC PDs as commented above. 
Based on the particular way they are constructed, they are less demanding for banks 
since for upturns they will be more similar to PIT PDs and, consequently, the capital 
figures will be much lower than those calculated using TTC PDs. Their main drawback arises 
in downturns when the amount of capital will not assure with a 99.9% probability that 
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losses will be covered. From a supervisory perspective long-run averages fall short of the 
most important advantage of TTC PDs without significantly improving its main caveat. 
Other things being equal, TTC PDs, as presented in this paper, seem superior to long-run 
averages. 
In principle, acyclical PDs should be the most preferred measure whenever 
the model that produces them carefully sets aside the cyclical effect without totally 
ignoring its consequences. If a rating system could get rid of the fluctuations that the 
cycle incorporates and appropriately estimate the risk profile of obligors, via their idiosyncratic 
features, this could avoid extreme swings in PDs and in required capital. This may constitute 
the solution regulators are looking for. The deterioration of the prevailing economic conditions 
would make obligors migrate to lower credit quality categories implying higher average PDs 
for the entire portfolio, and the opposite would happen in boom periods. Acyclical measures 
would probably be the most effective, still allowing for certain variability in capital 
requirements, but without the huge swings that PIT PDs seem to produce. 
 A half-way compromise might be to use a through-the-cycle approach but based 
not on the worst position in the cycle but on a somehow less extreme approach. That might 
produce significantly higher capital than required in expansions while still producing greater 
capital in recessions, but without the high level in average terms that a pure TTC approach 
requires. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper provides a simple methodology for banks and bank supervisors to analyze 
procyclicality of Basel II capital requirements. We focus on mortgages, one of the most under 
researched areas of Basel II, even despite the fact that for many banks, they are one of their 
largest credit portfolios. We take advantage of the Spanish Credit Register, a comprehensive 
database that contains loan and borrower information (including credit risk performance) 
for the last twenty years (i.e. almost two business cycles). 
We estimate a probability of default model for mortgages, using information 
of roughly 3 million borrowers. This model includes several risk profile variables (liquidity 
constraints and default and delinquency past history of each borrower) and a macro variable 
(GDP growth rate) and allows us to assign to each individual a single probability of default. 
Based on these probabilities and on different approaches, depending on the nature of the 
measure to be calculated, we obtain distinct averages that allow us to study their properties 
and adequacy for regulatory capital. 
In short, we compare point-in-time, through-the-cycle, long-run averages, cyclically 
corrected, and acyclical PDs. The comparison of these approximations to measure credit 
risk, provides us with evidence which translates into a highly significant variability, in particular 
of point-in-time PDs, along the cycle with huge changes in capital requirements from peak 
(expansion) to trough (recession). That variability raises a concern for supervisors who aim to 
apply the more advanced approaches included in Basel II. 
Through-the-cycle measures show much less variability, although the average 
level of capital requirements is relatively high. Acyclical ratings produce stable and 
relatively low requirements. Thus, a reasonable compromise might be the use of TTC ratings, 
but not using the worst point in the cycle to compute them. An alternative compromise 
might well be the use of acyclical PD measures which share most of their properties with 
TTC PDs with the advantage of being more benign, in terms of required capital, during 
upturns. However, attention should be paid in the way the cyclical effect is taken out when 
estimating those PDs. 
All in all, we show that Basel II procyclicality is an open issue that deserves careful 
scrutiny for mortgage portfolios and, by extension, for corporate and retail ones. In any case, 
the Basel II framework has within itself the mechanism to deal with this issue (i.e. rating 
system properties and supervisory implementation). 
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Table 1.  Descriptive characteristics of the population and the sample used  
Each row presents both for the whole population and for the sample of borrowers to 
be used to estimate the PD model the following information: the total number of mortgages 
loans (Total Operations); the exposure they represent (in thousand euros); the average 
value of a mortgage (in thousand euros); the value of a mortgage in the 90th percentile 
(in thousand euros); the value of the problem loans ratio (value of defaulted loans divided by 
the total value of mortgage loans) and the proportion of defaults (number of defaulted 
borrowers over the total number of borrowers). 
 
Year Total Operations 
Exposure   
(thousand €) 
Average loan 
(thousand €) 
90th 
Percentile 
(thousand €) 
Problem 
loans ratio 
Proportion 
of defaults 
1990 1,095,881 17,900,000 16.4 30.0 4.0% 3.4% 
1990 sample 109,803 1,800,348 16.4 30.0 4.0% 3.3% 
1993 1,792,216 33,100,000 18.5 36.0 4.2% 3.6% 
1993 sample 179,814 3,328,174 18.5 36.0 4.2% 3.6% 
1997 3,967,016 82,100,000 20.7 42.0 0.9% 0.9% 
1997 sample 396,034 8,220,267 20.8 42.0 0.9% 0.9% 
2001 5,787,661 162,000,000 28.0 55.0 0.4% 0.7% 
2001 sample 578,260 16,200,000 28.0 55.0 0.4% 0.7% 
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Table 2a.  Estimation of the logit model (1) by maximum likelihood 
ittititit CONTROLGDPGLIQBORRRISKBORRPD ηββββ ++++= 4321  (1) 
This table presents the results of the estimation of the above equation. The GDP growth rate 
represents the rate of growth of the Gross National Product. DEHFIST informs whether or not 
a certain borrower has defaulted in any period earlier to the one used to fix the assessment 
period for calculating each borrower PD. OVERHIST stands for possible delinquency of a 
borrower in history. CHANOVERHIST is the rate of variation of OVERHIST. AGE accounts for 
the age of each loan. UTIL represents the quotient between the amount of credit drawn 
and the total amount of credit. NUMBANKS is the number of banks with which each borrower 
has lending relationships. Dumreg_99 is a dummy variable which reflects the change in the 
report in defaulted loans after 1999. Regional dummies account for the region of the borrower 
while Type of lender dummies differentiates the nature (ownership) of the lender. 
No. of observations: 2,936,193. Sampling period: 1990-2004. In parenthesis is the 
standard error of the coefficient. All variables are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
GDP growth rate -0.15 -0.147 -0.146 -0.144 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
DEFHIST 3.61 3.65 3.66 3.69 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
OVERHIST 1.31 1.20 1.23 1.14 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
CHANOVERHIST 0.49 0.53 0.48 0.52 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.029) (0.03) 
AGE -1.89 -1.84 -1.91 -1.85 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
UTIL 2.30 2.03 2.44 2.18 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.144) 
NUMBANKS 0.74 0.876 0.76 0.88 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.019) 
dumreg_99  0.13 0.09 0.13 0.093 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes No No 
     
Type of lender Dummies Yes No Yes No 
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Table 2b.  Logit Model Performance 
This table reports the performing power of the regression model. It provides the figure 
of correctly classified defaulted borrowers (combination of the columns headed “observed 
defaults” and “predicted defaults”). It is also provided the proportion of correctly classified 
non-defaulted borrowers (combination of the columns headed “observed non-defaults” 
and “predicted non-defaults”) and implicitly the ratio of correctly classified borrowers by the 
regression model (sum of the combination of the columns headed “observed defaults” and 
“predicted defaults” and the combination of the columns headed “observed non-defaults” 
and “predicted non-defaults” over the total number of borrowers). It is also shown the ROC 
curve value and the Accuracy Ratio. 
 
 Classification Table   
  
Equation 
Model   
 Observed Defaults  
Observed 
Non–defaults Total 
Predicted 19,009  681,114 700,123 
Defaults 64.50%  23.00%  
     
Predicted 10,447  2,280,541 2,291,018 
Non-defaults 35.50%  77.00%  
     
Total 29,486  2,961,655 2,991,141 
 
Area under ROC curve = 0.78. 
Accuracy ratio = 57%. 
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Table 3.  Probabilities of default (PDs) along the cycle 
Probabilities of default are reported per annum. PIT PDs are calculated by dividing the 
number of obligors which default in a certain year by the total number of obligors. The yearly 
TTC PD is the simple average of the predicted PD for each borrower using model (1) 
estimates when the value of the cyclical variable, GDP growth rate, is fixed at its most adverse 
sample value. Long-run-average PDs are obtained by calculating the cumulative average of 
the yearly averages of the predicted PD for each borrower using model (1) estimates. 
Cyclically corrected yearly PDs are obtained by calculating the simple average of the fitted 
PDs for each borrower using model (1) when the value of the GDP growth rate is fixed at its 
sample average value. Finally, the acyclical PD is the annual average of borrower’s predicted 
PDs when the effect of the cyclical variable has been omitted. The last two rows of the table 
show the sample average (1991-2004 simple average) and its standard deviation for each of 
the above-described PDs. 
 
 PD PD PD PD PD 
Year PIT TTC Long-run average 
Cyclically 
corrected Acyclical 
1991 2.27% 2.49% 2.41% 1.55% 1.62% 
1992 2.55% 2.80% 2.55% 1.77% 1.85% 
1993 2.91% 2.56% 2.73% 1.61% 1.68% 
1994 2.18% 2.33% 2.55% 1.46% 1.51% 
1995 1.24% 2.30% 2.22% 1.44% 1.49% 
1996 0.96% 2.04% 1.97% 1.25% 1.29% 
1997 0.61% 1.87% 1.74% 1.13% 1.17% 
1998 0.41% 1.60% 1.55% 0.95% 0.98% 
1999 0.49% 1.61% 1.49% 0.95% 0.92% 
2000 0.66% 1.58% 1.43% 0.93% 0.90% 
2001 0.59% 1.54% 1.37% 0.92% 0.88% 
2002 0.54% 1.49% 1.32% 0.88% 0.85% 
2003 0.44% 1.41% 1.27% 0.84% 0.81% 
2004 0.58% 1.36% 1.22% 0.80% 0.77% 
Sample average 1.05% 1.88% 1.80% 1.15% 1.19% 
Std.dev. 0.90% 0.49% 0.55% 0.33% 0.37% 
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Table 4.  Basel II capital requirements (annual averages) 
Each row of this table reveals the yearly capital figure using the IRB Basel II formula for 
mortgage loans when different types of annual average PDs are used: point-in-time (PIT), 
through-the-cycle (TTC), long-run average, corrected for the cycle (cyclically corrected) and 
acyclical. The last three rows present the sample average (1991-2004 simple average), 
its standard deviation and the range of variation for each capital figure using as input for its 
computation each of the annual average PDs described above. The range of variation 
is defined as the maximum observed variation in value for each capital figure. 
 
 PD PD PD PD PD 
Year PIT TTC Long-run average 
Cyclically 
corrected Acyclical 
1991 2.53% 2.68% 2.63% 2.00% 2.06% 
1992 2.72% 2.87% 2.72% 2.17% 2.24% 
1993 2.93% 2.72% 2.83% 2.05% 2.11% 
1994 2.47% 2.57% 2.71% 1.93% 1.97% 
1995 1.73% 2.55% 2.50% 1.91% 1.95% 
1996 1.46% 2.37% 2.32% 1.74% 1.78% 
1997 1.07% 2.25% 2.15% 1.63% 1.66% 
1998 0.81% 2.04% 2.00% 1.46% 1.48% 
1999 0.92% 2.05% 1.95% 1.45% 1.42% 
2000 1.14% 2.02% 1.90% 1.44% 1.40% 
2001 1.06% 1.99% 1.85% 1.42% 1.38% 
2002 0.99% 1.95% 1.80% 1.38% 1.35% 
2003 0.85% 1.89% 1.76% 1.34% 1.30% 
2004 1.04% 1.84% 1.71% 1.30% 1.26% 
Sample average 1.56% 2.26% 2.20% 1.65% 1.69% 
Std.dev. 0.77% 0.35% 0.40% 0.30% 0.34% 
Variation range 2.12% 1.03% 1.11% 0.88% 0.98% 
 
               BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0712 
Figure 1.  PDs and GDP growth rate 
This figure presents (left axis) the level and shape of the different types of PDs obtained 
from equation (1).These are: point-in-time, PIT, through-the-cycle, TTC, long-run-average, 
corrected for the cycle (cyclically corrected) and acyclical. The GDP growth rate is depicted in 
the right axis. 
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Figure 2.  Capital requirements (sample averages) 
This figure depicts the yearly capital figure using the IRB Basel II formula for mortgage loans 
when different types of annual average PDs are used: point-in-time (PIT), through-the-cycle 
(TTC), long-run average, corrected for the cycle (cyclically corrected) and acyclical. 
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